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This study examines a channel, students’ nuisance, to explain grade inﬂation. “Students’ nui-
sance” is deﬁned by “students’ pestering the professors for better grades.” This paper contains
two parts: the game theoretic model and the empirical tests. The model shows that the poten-
tial threat of students’ nuisance can induce the professors to inﬂate grades. Ceteris paribus, a
student is more likely to study little and to pester the professor for a better grade if: 1. the pro-
fessor is lenient; 2. the studying cost is high; 3. the reward from pestering is high; 4. the cost of
pestering is low.
My original survey data show that 70%+ of professors think that students’ nuisance is “an-
noying” and “costly in terms of time, effort, and energy.” Regression results indicate that the
more the student values the grade, the higher the studying cost, and the more likely the student
is to pester the professor.
JEL classiﬁcation codes: D82, I20, I21
Keywords: grade inﬂation, grade exaggeration, students’ nuisance
I Introduction
In the New Testament, Luke 18:2-5,
In a certain town there was a judge who neither feared God nor cared about men.
And there was a widow in that town who kept coming to him with the plea, ‘Grant
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1me justice against my adversary.’ For some time he refused. But ﬁnally he said to
himself, ‘Even though I don’t fear God or care about men, yet because this widow
keeps bothering me, I will see that she gets justice, so that she won’t eventually wear
me out with her coming!’
Grade inﬂation adversely affects our society. Graduate schools and employers cannot make
informed admission or hiring decisions because applicants’ grade inﬂated transcripts are over-
dramatic. With different degrees of grade inﬂation existing across academic institutions, it
is difﬁcult for graduate schools and employers to evaluate and compare different applicants
by merely reading their transcripts. Even ignoring this complication, grade inﬂation results
in “grade compression” at the upper end, and truly outstanding students cannot distinguish
themselves from second-best students who receive good grades through inﬂation (Sabot and
Wakeman-Linn, 1991; Rosovsky and Hartley, 2002).
The causes of grade inﬂation are widely discussed among researchers and educators. Per-
haps one of the most common explanations for grade inﬂation is that professors’ attempt to
“buy” good evaluations from students for tenure and promotion considerations. Grades directly
affect students’ well-being, so students rate professors according to the grades received. In or-
der to get better evaluations from students, professors “bribe” students by giving easy A’s and
B’s (McKenzie, 1975; Zangenehzadeh, 1988; Wallace and Wallace, 1998; Krautmann and Sander,
1999; Kanagaretnam et al, 2003).1
Of course, researchers might overemphasize the marginal importance of teaching evalua-
tions in tenure and promotion considerations. That is to say, teaching evaluations might play a
signiﬁcant role in the personnel review process at academic institutions that place a relatively
1See the literature review in section II for other proposed explanations.
2large weight on teaching over research. In research universities, however, research publica-
tions, rather than teaching evaluations, are essential in promotion considerations, given that
the professor meets some minimum standard in teaching. Therefore, faculty members at such
institutions would have a relatively small incentive to improve their teaching evaluations. Nev-
ertheless, faculty members in research universities might inﬂate grades, not because they desire
better teaching evaluations, but because they need more time and energy for research. By in-
ﬂating grades, a professor can ensure few students will pester her for more points. This way,
the professor is able to allocate more time to her own research, which is truly important for her
promotion.
This study suggests that, in addition to the desire for a better teaching evaluation and other
established causes, grade inﬂation also results from a potential threat of students’ nuisance, espe-
cially in research universities. I deﬁne students’ nuisance as “students’ pestering the professors
for better grades.” Anecdotal evidence suggests that, unsatisﬁed with their grades, college stu-
dents pester professors to obtain added points. College professors are frequently besieged by
persistent students who request upward adjustments of their grades. In some cases, due to
grading mistakes, students do have a legitimate reason to make such requests. Yet, there are
many cases where the students do not deserve the points they request. Some students do not
walk away until they get the points they want. These students are persistent, sending emails to
the professor, trying to persuade the professor during class breaks, dropping by the professor’s
ofﬁce, making the same requests, or repeatedly asking for regrading of their exams.2 Nuisance
is costly to the professors in terms of time and energy, especially to generally overwhelmed ju-
nior faculty who are striving hard for tenure in research universities. Instead of dealing with
2See Appendix E.1 for anecdotes collected from professors and TAs in the Department of Economics, UC Irvine.
3students’ requests, the professors could have invested the time in research, teaching prepara-
tion, and department service. To preempt students’ nuisance, professors might inﬂate students’
grades in the ﬁrst place, so that there will be no or few students coming to pester them.
The term “grade inﬂation” is often referred to same quality students receiving higher grades
today than those before; hence, there is a time dimension in that deﬁnition. In this paper, how-
ever, “grade inﬂation” is referred to static “grade exaggeration;” that is, professors or instructors
set low standards and grade over-leniently.
While this paper focuses on students’ pestering for better grades, the model has a broad
scope. It can be applied to the scenarios with telemarketers, solicitors, salespeople, and stock-
brokers who work hard to persuade potential customers to try or to buy their products and ser-
vices. The nuisance might wear out some people that they end up buying the products and/or
services they do not need, or donate funds they might not really care to donate.
After presenting a brief review of the grade inﬂation literature in section II, section III in-
troduces a game theoretic model of one professor and n students. The model describes the
dynamics between the students’ pestering for added points and the professor’s grading. Sec-
tion III also discusses some real-world implications of the theoretical results, such as the types
of students that are more likely to pester the professor, and some possible methods to reduce
grade inﬂation due to students’ nuisance. Section III.7 extends the model to include asymmetric
information about the professor’s types. Section IV utilizes four distinct data sets (two of which
are from original surveys conducted by myself) to test empirically some important propositions
in the model. Section V concludes.
4II Literature Review
Manystudiesdocumentgradeinﬂation. Inasurveyof180colleges, Juola(1980)discoversa0.432
grade point average (GPA) rise from 1960 to 1974. In a survey of 4,900 undergraduate students,
Levine and Cureton (1998) ﬁnd that from 1969 to 1993, the percentage of grades of A- or higher
increased from 7 to 26 percent, while grades of C or below dropped from 25 to 9 percent. Kuh
and Hu (1999) study 52,256 student surveys of two different periods, mid 1980s and mid 1990s,
from the Colleges Students Experiences Questionnaire. They ﬁnd that GPAs rose on average
from 3.07 to 3.34 at various academic institutions. In a survey of seven Ontario universities for
the period 1973-1974 and 1993-1994, Anglin and Meng (2000) ﬁnd signiﬁcant grade inﬂation
in various Arts and Science programs. Cheong (2000) ﬁnds a trend of grade inﬂation for the
past twelve years in the University of Hawaii at Manoa. Some suggest that students today are
more intelligent than those a few decades ago, so students today deserve better grades. This
argument, however, is contradicted by the fact that the trend of test scores (SATs, ACTs, and
GREs) were declining from 1965 to 1980 (Wilson, 1999). As such, the real grade inﬂation could
be more severe than nominal grade inﬂation.
Thecausesofgradeinﬂationarewidelydiscussedamongresearchersandeducators. Rosovsky
and Hartley (2002) summarize several causes of grade inﬂation, including the Vietnam War, the
response to student diversity, student teaching evaluation, the idea of “students as customers,”
the watering down of course content at some academic institutions, and the role of adjuncts.
McKenzie (1975), Zangenehzadeh (1988), Wallace and Wallace (1998), Krautmann and Sander
(1999), and Kanagaretnam et al (2003) suggest that grade inﬂation is a by-product of teaching
evaluations. Wallace and Wallace (1998) claim that the course workload and expected grades
5directly reﬂect students’ happiness. To please students and thereby receive good evaluations, a
professor reduces the workload and inﬂates grades. Kanagaretnam et al. suggest that the pur-
pose of students’ evaluation is to motivate the professors to exert high effort in teaching, thereby
increasing the knowledge of students. Yet, professors could manipulate students into giving
good teaching evaluations by lenient grading. McKenzie (1975) argues that, by inﬂating grades,
the professor shifts students’ constraints out, so that students enjoy better bundles of leisure time
and grade. Hence, “the professor’s rating will rise because of ‘reduced standards’ ” (p. 101).
Krautmann and Sander (1999) study the relationship between student evaluations and expected
grades and other variables. Using graduate courses and core courses as instrumental variables
for expected grade, they show that students’ expected grades affect teaching evaluations. They
conclude that faculty members can buy better evaluations by lowering grading standards. In a
study of graduates from Swedish upper secondary schools, Wikstrom and Wikstrom (2005) ar-
gue that school competition results in modest grade inﬂation. Hernandez (2005) suggests merit
based scholarships might induce grade inﬂation. Merit based scholarships require applicants to
meet a minimum GPA requirement. The purpose of this requirement is to encourage students
to study hard; yet, the requirement might induce instructors to lower grading standards. Bar et
al. (2007) ﬁnd that Cornell University’s new policy to report course median grade online affects
students’ course selection and contributes to grade inﬂation. To my knowledge, no one has ex-
plored the idea of “student’s nuisance” as a cause of grade inﬂation. This study aims to ﬁll this
void in the literature.
6III The Game Theoretic Model
III.1 The Model
A professor p and n students (i = 1;2:::n) play the following game of complete information.

























Figure 1 shows only one game tree between the professor and one student.
Keep in mind that the professor plays this game with n students simultaneously.
Sequence of Actions (see Figure 1)
1. Each student i independently and simultaneously chooses a studying effort level, ei ¸ 0,
7prior to the exam, and then takes the exam.
2. The professor (p) determines whether to inﬂate each student i’s grade, and the grade is
revealed to each student i. If the professor inﬂates the grade of student i, the professor
adds ´ extra points to student i’s grade. The game ends with student i and his payoff is
realized.
3. Each student i whose grade was not inﬂated at t = 1 independently and simultaneously
chooses to pester the professor or to accept the uninﬂated grade. If student i accepts the
grade, the game ends with him and his payoff is realized. For simplicity, assume students
are unable to collude with one another.
4. If student i pesters the professor, she determines whether to inﬂate student i’s grade or to
reject his request. If the professor grants the request of student i, the professor adds ´ extra
points to the student’s grade. The professor’s decision will be ﬁnal.
The professor plays the same game with n students, while each student plays the same game
independently and simultaneously with the professor.
The Payoff Functions: The professor’s loss function can be expressed as follows:
Lp = N(x) + M(y) + F(z);
where N(x) is the nuisance cost, M(y) is the moral cost, and F(z) is the sympathy cost. The
professor incurs a nuisance cost N(x), with N(0) = 0, N0 > 0 and N00 > 0, if she is pestered,
x being the number of pestering students. N(x) captures the professor’s opportunity cost and
emotion cost when the students pester her. The convexity reﬂects an increasing marginal cost
of nuisance. For example, dealing with the tenth pestering student is more costly than dealing
with the second pestering student is, as each student’s nuisance becomes more annoying as the
8number of pestering students increases.
The professor incurs a moral cost, M(y), with M(0) = 0, M0 > 0 and M00 < 0, when she
inﬂates grades, y being the number of students who receive inﬂated grades. M(y) captures the
disutility the professor suffers from giving in to students’ requests for added points. When not
having inﬂated any grades, the cost of inﬂating one student’s grade might be large. She feels
guilty for unjustiﬁably increasing the student’s grade and not fulﬁlling her responsibilities as a
professor. When she inﬂates another student’s grade, the added cost falls.
Finally, the professor incurs a sympathy cost F(z), with F(0) = 0, F0 > 0 and F00 < 0, if she
rejects students’ requests for added points, z being the number of students whose requests are
turned down. The student might beg for a better grade, and the professor might feel guilty for
turning the students away; the F function reﬂects this cost. The F function is concave: the added
sympathy cost drops as the professor denies more requests, because the professor gets used to
students’ crying faces. The professor’s objective is to minimize her loss. The professor is said
to be “strict” if 8w, M(w) > F(w), w being any number of students; otherwise, the professor is
“lenient.” That is to say, the professor is “strict” if moral cost is greater than sympathy cost for
any number of students; otherwise, the professor is “lenient.”
The student’s payoff function can be expressed as follows:
Ui = g
®i
i ¡ ¸i ¢ ei ¡ · ¢ mi; gi = ei + Ii[´];
where gi is the grade (which might be inﬂated or not) of student i, ®i 2 (0;1) is student i’s value
of the grade. ¸i 2 (0;®) is student i’s unit cost of studying, which captures his degree of laziness
and the inverse of his effectiveness of effort in studying. ¸i is assumed to be less than ®i for each
student, because a college student should not be too lazy or ineffective in studying; otherwise,
9they would not enter college in the ﬁrst place. The professor knows the distribution of ®i and
¸i, but she does not know each student’s ®i and ¸i. For instance, if the professor teaches an
honor class, she knows students are relatively diligent; however, she cannot identify the diligent
and lazy students. ei is the chosen studying effort level; mi = 0 or 1 is the number of times
student i pesters the professor; and · is the exogenous pestering cost, such as the time spent on
sending emails to the professor or visiting the professor in person. Ii is the index function of
grade inﬂation. If there is no grade inﬂation for student i, Ii = 0, and his grade is equal to the
studying effort level, ei. If there is grade inﬂation for student i, Ii = 1, and his grade is equal
to the studying effort level ei plus some exogenous grade inﬂation points, ´ > 0. Each student
i’s grade perfectly reﬂects his studying effort level if there is no grade inﬂation for him. Note
that if the grade depends stochastically on the studying effort level, the main results of students’
pestering behavior will not change, although they will exert higher studying effort due to their
risk averse utility functions. Therefore, this study will focus on the special case where each
student i’ grade perfectly reﬂects his studying effort level in the absence of grade inﬂation.
The chosen studying effort level (ei) enters student i’s utility function through two channels.
A higher studying effort level brings about a better grade, which increases student i’s utility.
However, studying is costly, so a higher studying effort level also lessens student i’s utility.
Student i may boost his grade by studying hard (choosing a higher ei) prior to the exam, and/or
by pestering the professor for added points after the exam. Assume that if student i is indifferent
between pestering or not, he will choose not to pester the professor.
Strategies Since this is a dynamic game, a strategy is a plan of actions. The professor can
choose to inﬂate the grade of each student i or not at t = 1 and t = 3. I will focus on the
10following three strategies, NI, PI, and D, where
² NI (No Grade Inﬂation): Never inﬂate any student’s grade. In other words, the professor’s
action is “do not inﬂate grades” at t = 1 and t = 3.
² PI (Preemptive Grade Inﬂation): Inﬂate all students’ grades at t = 1. That is, the professor
inﬂates grades at t = 1 and t = 3.
² D (Delaying Grade Inﬂation): Do not inﬂate any student’s grade at t = 1. At t = 3, inﬂate
student i’s grade if he pesters at t = 2.
Each student i’s strategy is his studying effort level ei prior to the exam, and a plan to pester the
professor: Si = f(ei;A);(ei;CP)g, where
² A (Accepting the grade): Accept the given grade and never pester the professor.
² CP (Conditional Pestering): Pester the professor if the grade is not inﬂated at t = 1.
III.2 Backward Induction
Using backward induction, it can be shown that there exist three subgame perfect equilibria.
Deﬁnition A professor is “strict” if M(w) ¸ F(w)8w. That is, if w students pester the pro-
fessor, the moral cost of inﬂating the grades for these w students is higher than the sympathy
cost of not granting the requests of these w students. By contrast, a professor is “lenient” if
M(w) < F(w)8w.
Proposition III.1 (No Grade Inﬂation Equilibrium) If the professor is “strict”
¡
M(w) ¸ F(w)8w, w
being any number of students
¢
, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium where the professor does not
inﬂate grades, and all students accept the grades.
11Proposition III.2 (Delaying Grade Inﬂation Equilibrium): If 1. the professor is “lenient”
¡
M(w) <
F(w)8w, w being any number of students
¢
and 2. the distributions of students’ ®i and ¸i are such
that the proportion of potential pestering students is relatively small, then there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium where the professor delays grade inﬂation, n1 students pester, and n2 students accept the
grades.
Proposition III.3 (Preemptive Grade Inﬂation Equilibrium): If 1. the professor is “lenient”
¡
M(w) <
F(w)8w, w being any number of students
¢
and 2. the distributions of students’ ®i and ¸i are such
that the proportion of potential pestering students is relatively large, then there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium where the professor preemptively inﬂates the grades for all students at t = 1, and no student
pesters the professor.
Proof for Proposition III.1 Suppose w 2 [0;n] students pestered the professor at t = 2. At
t = 3, if the professor inﬂates the grades for these w students, her loss will be N(w) + M(w) +
F(0) = N(w) + M(w). If she does not inﬂate the grades for the w students, her loss will be
N(w)+M(0)+F(w)=N(w)+F(w). Note that the nuisance cost is sunk at t = 3. If the professor
is “strict,” she will choose not to inﬂate the grades at t = 3, because M(w) ¸ F(w)8w. Knowing
this, allstudentswillacceptthegradesatt = 2. Pesteringcosts·, sothereisnopointtopesterthe
professor if the professor does not change students’ grades anyway. Knowing all students will
accept the grades, the professor will not inﬂate grades at t = 1. Therefore,
¡
sp = NI;si = A8i
¢
are mutually best responses. The utility function of the students can be expressed as follows:
Ui(eijsp = NI;si = A) = e
®i
i ¡ ¸iei









Proof for Propositions III.2 and III.3 Suppose w 2 [0;n] students pestered the professor
at t = 2. At t = 3, if the professor inﬂates the grades for these w students, her loss will be
N(w) + M(w) + F(0) = N(w) + M(w). If she does not inﬂate the grades for the w students, her
loss will be N(w) + M(0) + F(w)=N(w) + F(w). Again, the nuisance cost is sunk at t = 3. If the
professor is “lenient,” she will inﬂate the grades at t = 3, because M(w) < F(w)8w. Given the
professor’s strategy, student i’s best response is to pester the professor if (ei + ´)®i ¡ ¸iei ¡ · >
e
®i
i ¡ ¸iei; otherwise, he will accept the grade. That is to say, student i will pester if his chosen
effort level ei is less than a threshold effort level ei;0, where
(ei;0 + ´)®i ¡ ¸i ¢ ei;0 ¡ · = e
®i
i;0 ¡ ¸i ¢ ei;0:
The left hand side of the equation represents the utility of student i if he pesters the professor.
This utility is evaluated at any studying effort level ei. Student i receives some added points, ´,
by bearing the pestering cost, ·. The right hand side of the equation represents the utility of the
student if he accepts the grade. Rearranging, we have
(ei;0 + ´)®i ¡ e
®i
i;0 = ·: (2)
The left hand side of the equation represents the discrete difference in utility for pestering, and
the right hand side of the equation represents the cost of pestering. At ei = ei;0, the marginal
beneﬁt is equal to the marginal cost of pestering, given the professor delays grade inﬂation. If
13equation (2) holds, the student is indifferent between pestering and accepting the grade. It can
be shown that3
(ei + ´)®i ¡ e®i · · 8ei ¸ ei;0; (3)
(ei + ´)®i ¡ e®i > · 8ei < ei;0: (4)
Therefore, if the optimally chosen studying effort satisﬁes inequality (3), the student has no in-
centive to pester the professor, for the possibility of adding ´ points to his grade does not induce
this student to pester his professor. By contrast, if the optimally chosen effort level satisﬁes
inequality (4), the student will pester the professor.
Suppose the distribution of ®i and ¸i is such that, given the professor delays grade inﬂa-
tion, n1 students pester, and n2 (= n ¡ n1) students accept the grade
¡
(sp = D;si = CP;sj =
A)i2n1;j2n2
¢
. The utility functions of each student can be expressed as follows:
Ui(eijsp = D;si = CP) = (ei + ´)®i ¡ ¸iei ¡ ·;
Uj(ejjsp = D;sj = A) = e
®j
j ¡ ¸jej:
Differentiating Ui with respect to ei and Uj with respect to ej to ﬁnd the ﬁrst order condition,














1¡®j ¸ ej;0: (6)
Call the n1 students “potential pestering students.” Let q be the proportion of potential pes-
tering students (q = n1
n ). If the professor delays grade inﬂation, her loss will be
Lp(D;q) = N(qn) + M(qn) + F(0); (7)
3See Appendix A.1.
14since qn students pester the professor, and she gives in to those students’ requests. If the profes-
sor preemptively inﬂates students’ grades, her loss will be
Lp(PI;q) = M(n) + F(0); (8)
since the game ends after she inﬂates all students’ grades at t = 1, and no students will pester
her. It can be shown4 that for all n, there exists only one q¤ 2 (0;1) such that
N(q¤n) + M(q¤n) = M(n); (9)
where
N(qn) + M(qn) < M(n) 8q < q¤; (10)
N(qn) + M(qn) > M(n) 8q > q¤: (11)
q¤ can be viewed as the threshold proportion of potential pestering students. Recall that q is
the actual proportion of potential pestering students. If the proportion of potential pestering
students is relatively small (q < q¤), the professor prefers delaying grade inﬂation (D) over pre-
emptive grade inﬂation (PI) according to equation (10). By contrast, if q > q¤, the professor
prefers to preemptively inﬂates grades at t = 1, because she does not want so many students
to pester her. If the distribution of ®i and ¸i is such that q < q¤, the professor prefers to delay
grade inﬂation over preemptive grade inﬂation. If the professor is “lenient,” and the propor-
tion of potential pestering students is relatively large (q > q¤), the professor prefers preemptive




. Given the professor
preemptively inﬂates grades, n1 students pester if grade is not inﬂated at t = 1, and n2 students
accept the grades
¡
(sp = PI;si = CP;sj = A)i2n1;j2n2
¢
, the utility functions of the students can
4See Appendix B.1.
15be expressed as follows:
Ui(eijsp = PI;si = CP) = (ei + ´)®i ¡ ¸iei
Uj(ejjsp = PI;sj = A) = (ej + ´)®j ¡ ¸jej:
Differentiating Ui with respect to ei and Uj with respect to ej to ﬁnd the ﬁrst order condition,














1¡®j ¡ ´ ¸ ej;0: (13)
¥
Note that equations (1), (5), (6) (12), and (13) show that all optimal studying effort levels are
increasing in the value of the grade (®i) and decreasing in the unit cost of studying (¸i) (see
Appendix A.3 for proof). Moreover, each student’s optimal studying effort level is higher when
there is no grade inﬂation than when there is preemptive grade inﬂation
¡




Proposition III.4 The equilibrium optimal studying effort level is increasing in the student’s value of
the grade (®i) and decreasing in the student’s unit cost of studying (¸i).
Proposition III.5 Each student’s optimal studying effort level is relatively lower when the professor
preemptively inﬂates grades (sp = PI) than the optimal studying effort level when the professor does not
inﬂate grades (sp = NI).
16Figure 2: Decision to Pester when the Professor is “Lenient”
Pestering  Accepting the grade 
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III.3 Decision to Pester
Each student i’s decision to pester depends on the professor’s strategy, the student’s own thresh-
old effort level ei;0 and his optimally chosen studying effort level, e¤
i. ei;0 and e¤
i depend on the
value of the grade (®i), studying cost (¸i), added points (´ ) and pestering cost (·). Recall that ei;0
is the threshold studying effort level that student i is indifferent between pestering the professor




. The student will pester the
professor if e¤





It can be shown that ei;0, e¤
i;D;CP, and e¤





























Value of the Grade Equation (14) suggests that given any chosen studying effort level, the
more the student values his grade (a large ®i), the more likely the student is to pester the pro-
fessor for a better grade after the exam. Figure 2 shows that, as ®i increases, ei;0 moves to the
right; hence, it is easier for any studying effort level to fall into the “pestering” region. However,
17equations (15) and (16) suggest that the optimal studying effort level is increasing in ®i. Figure 2
shows that, as ®i grows, e¤
i moves to the right, away from the pestering region. In other words,
a high value of the grade ®i makes a student more likely to pester after the exam, according to





. Therefore, the relationship between the value of the
grade ®i and the decision to pester is ambiguous. In Figure 2, as ®i increases, both ei;0 and e¤
i
move to the right. If the nuisance threshold ei;0 rises faster than the optimal effort level e¤
i does,
the marginal beneﬁt of pestering is higher than the marginal beneﬁt of studying. As a result,
the student is more likely to pester the professor. Yet, if the optimal studying effort level e¤
i rises
faster than the nuisance threshold ei;0 does, the marginal beneﬁt of studying is higher than the
marginal beneﬁt of nuisance. Consequently, the student will study hard before the exam and not
to pester after the exam.
Proposition III.6 The relationship between the value of the grade (®i) and the likelihood of pestering is
ambiguous.
Studying Cost An increase in unit cost of studying ¸i does not affect the threshold ei;0, but
brings down the optimal studying effort level, e¤
i. Figure 2 shows that a lower optimal effort
level is more likely to fall into the “pestering” region. Therefore, a student with high studying
cost is likely to study a little before the exam, and to pester the professor for added points after
the exam. By contrast, a student with a low studying cost is more likely to exert a high studying
effort prior to the exam and not to pester the professor afterwards. Thus, studying and pestering
are partial substitutes.
18Proposition III.7 An increase in the unit cost of studying (¸i) increases the likelihood of pestering.
Studying and pestering are partial substitutes.
Reward and Cost of Pestering An increase in the reward of pestering ´ increases the like-
lihood to pester. As shown in Figure 2, an increase in ´ shifts the threshold point ei;0 to the
right, making students more likely to pester. Likewise, a decrease in pestering cost · moves the
threshold ei;0 to the right: any studying effort level ei is more likely to fall into the “pestering”
region. Hence, decreasing pestering cost encourages students to pester the professor.
Proposition III.8 Other things being equal, students are more likely to pester the professor if the reward
of pestering (´) is high and/or the cost of pestering (·) is low.
Class Size So far, I have assumed a ﬁxed class size. The analysis will allow n to vary. It can




That is, the larger the size of the class, the smaller the threshold proportion of potential pestering
students (q¤) that the professor is indifferent between preemptive grade inﬂation and delaying
grade inﬂation. In other words, if the proportion of potential pestering student (q) is ﬁxed,






Proposition III.9 if the professor is “lenient” and the distributions of ®i and ¸i are ﬁxed, ceteris paribus,
the larger the class size, the more likely one observes preemptive grade inﬂation.
19III.4 Class Policy Implications
Obviously, therewouldbenogradeinﬂationequilibriumiftherewardofpestering(´)isequalto
zero. Infact, loweringtherewardofpesteringdiscouragesstudentsfrompestering. Forinstance,
a professor can re-grade the whole exam if a student asks for grade adjustments. The student
is told that his grade “might go up as well as go down” after the re-grading. The uncertainty
reduces the net reward of pestering, deterring students from pestering.
Given any studying effort level, a student is less likely to pester the professor if the pester-




. The emergence of emails drastically decreased students’
pestering cost, thereby increasing students’ nuisance. To avoid students’ pestering, the profes-
sor might refuse to read students’ emails about grading issues. For example, a professor might
announce to her students that she will not respond to email messages regarding grading. If stu-
dents have questions about their grades, they are required to visit the professor during her ofﬁce
hours. Visiting the professor is more costly than merely sending an email, especially for shy
students. Furthermore, a professor could require the student to submit a report of justiﬁcation if
he wishes to request added points for an assignment. Such a requirement also raises the cost of
pestering. For instance, before I passed back a midterm exam, I announced to my students that
I would adhere to the following policy: whoever requested re-grading would have to submit a
report of justiﬁcation, and I would re-grade the whole, rather than a part, of the exam. Students
looked very disappointed; eventually, only one of the 60+ students asked for re-grading; a much
smaller ﬁgure than usual.
Proposition III.9 suggests that, if the professor is “lenient,” other things being equal, the
larger the class size, the more likely the professor is to inﬂate grades preemptively. This is in-
20Table 1: Four Types of Students
Value of Grades Studying Cost Proportion Number if Number if
®i ¸i n = 40 n = 160
Type ¬ 0:5 0:125 0:10 4 16
Type ­ 0:5 0:25 0:05 2 8
Type ® 0:25 0:125 0:75 30 120
Type ¯ 0:25 0:25 0:10 4 16
tuitive: if ten percent of the students pester the professor in a class of 40, that would be four
pestering students. In a class of 160, the number would jump to 16. The marginal cost of stu-
dents’ nuisance is increasing in the number of pestering students, so the professor prefers to
preemptively inﬂate the grades of all students to avoid students’ nuisance. Thus, reducing class
sizes could reduce possible preemptive grade inﬂation.
III.5 A Numeric Example
Supposethereisoneprofessorand 40students offour types, ¬, ­, ®, ¯ (seeTable1). Type¬ and
type ­ students both highly value their grades, but the studying cost of type ¬ students is lower
than that of type ­ students. Perhaps type ¬ students are smarter and/or more diligent than
type ­ students are. The value of the grade is relatively lower for type ® and type ¯ students,
and the studying cost of type ® students is lower than that of type ¯ students.
Therewardofpestering´ = 0:75 5, andthepesteringcost· = 0:125. Theprofessor’snuisance
cost, moral cost, and sympathy cost functions are as follows: N(x) = x1:5;M(y) = y0:8;F(z) =
z0:9: Note that the professor is “lenient.” It can be shown that there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium where the professor delays grade inﬂation, type ¬ and type ® students accept the
5Keep in mind that the added points ´ is not necessarily out of one hundred.









1¡®i ¡ ´ ei;0 Proportion Action
Type ¬ 16¤ 15:25 8:6289 0:10 Accept
Type ­ 4 3:25¤ 8:6289 0:05 Pester
Type ® 2:52¤ 1:77 1:3659 0:75 Accept
Type ¯ 1 0:25¤ 1:3659 0:10 Pester
grades, whereas type and ­ and type ¯ students pester the professor.
Given the professor delays grade inﬂation, the students’ optimal effort level is e¤
i;D;CP < ei;0
if they pester the professor, and e¤
i;D;A ¸ ei;0 otherwise
¡
see equations (5) and (6)
¢
. Table 2
shows that the two type ­ and four type ¯ students choose effort level e2 = 3:25 and e4 = 0:25
and pester the professor, while the four type ¬ and thirty type ® students choose e1 = 16 and
e3 = 2:52 and to accept the grades. Hence, six students pester, and thirty four students accept
the grade.
The professor’s loss functions can now be expressed as follows:
L(D) = N(6) + M(6) = 61:5 + 60:8 = 18:89; L(PI) = M(40) = 400:8 = 19:13:
Delaying grade inﬂation provides a lower cost to the professor.
Class Size If the distributions of ® and ¸ are ﬁxed, but the class size jumps from 40 to 160,
L(D) = N(24) + M(24) = 241:5 + 240:8 = 130:29; L(PI) = M(160) = 1600:8 = 57:98:
Preemptive grade inﬂation is less costly than delaying grade inﬂation.
Positive Externality From this numeric example, one observes that when class size is small,
the professor inﬂates the grades of the potential pestering students. By contrast, when the class
22Table 3: Grades
Large Class Small Class
Professor’s Strategy Preemptive Grade Inﬂation Delaying Grade Inﬂation
Potential Pestering Students Inﬂated Grades Inﬂated Grades
Students who Never Pester Inﬂated Grades Deserved Grades
sizeislarge, theprofessorundiscriminatinglyinﬂatesgradesforallstudents. Thatistosay, when
theclasssizeislarge, studentswhoneverpestercanenjoythepositiveexternalityfromthethreat
of nuisance of potential pestering students. Potential pestering students receive inﬂated grades
regardless of class size, but students who do not pester receive inﬂated grades only if the class
size is large, given that the professor is lenient (see Table 3).
III.6 Who Pesters After All?
Anecdotal evidence collected from professors and TAs in the Department of Economics at UC
Irvine suggests that pestering students can be diligent or lazy. Once a hardworking student
(who received a B+) emailed me to ask for an A-: “I tried VERY hard to ensure I would pass
this class with an A-...I put in numerous hours each day, making sure all the notes were clear
and mastered...that I would get a high grade which would allow me to get an A-.” A TA told
me that his student complained to him: “I have been a straight A student. I have to have an A.”
By contrast, a lazy student skipped classes and studied little. One of my students was about to
fail the class, he begged “I will not be able to graduate on time if I do not pass this class with a
minimum C-.” One might picture the diligent pestering students as type ­ students in section
III.5. They study hard (e2 = 3:25 is the second highest studying effort level), and they highly
value their grades (® = 0:5). Yet, their studying cost is high (¸ = 0:25). Perhaps they are not as
23intelligent as type ¬ students are, who have the same value of the grade but a smaller studying
cost. Since type ­ students have a higher studying cost than type ¬ students do, type ­ students
have a comparative advantage in pestering; therefore, it makes sense for type­ to study less and
pester the professor after the exam.
One might picture the lazy pestering students as type ¯ students. They do not care so much
abouttheirgrades(® = 0:25)andtheyaretoolazytostudy(¸ = 0:25). Theireffortlevele4 = 0:25
is the lowest among the class. When they are about to fail the class, they beg the professor to
pass them so that they might be able to graduate.
A professor might also encounter a student who highly values academic performance and
studies diligently, but he does not pester the professor. He is a typical type ¬ student, who has
a high value of the grade (® = 0:5) but a relatively low cost of studying (¸ = 0:125), because he
is hard working and intelligent. Since the studying cost is low, the cost of pestering is relatively
high. Therefore, it makes sense for him to study hard and not to pester the professor.
III.7 Asymmetric Information
So far, due to the assumption of perfect information of professor’s type (lenient or strict), rejec-
tion from the professor does not occur. This section explains why in the real world, one observes
professors turning down students’ requests for better grades.
Suppose the professor is “strict.” By backward induction, in the ﬁnal stage, she will deny
students’ requests for added points. However, the students are unaware of the professor’s type;









= 1 ¡ ¼i:
24With prior ¼i, the professor is lenient; but with prior 1 ¡ ¼i, the professor is strict. Given any
studying effort level, student i is indifferent between pestering and accepting the grade if
¼i(ei + ´)®i + (1 ¡ ¼i)e
®i
i ¡ ¸iei ¡ · = e
®i
i ¡ ¸iei:
The left hand side of the equation represents the expected utility (evaluated at any studying
effort level ei) if student i pesters the professor. With prior ¼i, student i receives some added
points, ´,by incurring the pestering cost, ·. Yet, with prior 1 ¡ ¼i, his grade remains the same.









Let threshold ei;¼;0 be the solution to equation (18). It can be shown that (see Appendix C.1)
¼i
³




· · 8ei ¸ ei;¼;0 (19)
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> · 8ei < ei;¼;0: (20)
If the optimally chosen studying effort satisﬁes inequality (19), the student will not pester. By
contrast, if the optimally chosen effort level satisﬁes inequality (20), the student will pester. Note
that inequality (20) holds if student i strongly believes that the professor is “lenient” (a high ¼i),
if the studying cost is high (a high ¸i), if the points sought are high (a high ´), and if the cost of
pestering is low (a low ·). Again, one cannot tell whether an increase in the value of the grade
(®i) increases the likelihood that the student pesters the professor.
Given a prior ¼i, if student i is to pester the professor, his utility function can be expressed as
follows:
Ui(eij¼i;si = CP) = ¼i(ei + ´)®i + (1 ¡ ¼i)e
®i
i ¡ ¸iei ¡ ·:
25Given a prior ¼j, if student j accepts the grade, his utility function can be expressed as follows:
Uj(ejj¼j;sj = A) = e
®j
j ¡ ¸jej:
Differentiating Ui with respect to ei and Uj with respect to ej to ﬁnd the ﬁrst order condition,






















Equations (21) and (22) suggest that the higher the prior ¼i, the higher the studying cost ¸i,
the higher the reward from pestering ´, the lower the pestering cost ·, and the more likely the
student is to choose a low studying effort level ei and to pester the professor.
Proposition III.10 If there is asymmetric information and the professor is “strict,” there exists a sub-
game perfect equilibrium such that students who assign a high prior that the professor is “lenient” (high
¼i students) pester the professor, students who assign a low prior that the professor is “lenient” (low ¼i
students) accept the grades, and the professor denies the requests of the pestering students.
If the game is repeated, and the professor’s type does not change, students should update
their priors and the equilibrium rejection would not exist. For example, after the professor re-
jects student i’s request, he will update his prior ¼i from some positive number to zero. The
equilibrium in the repeated game will be the same as that in section III.2, “no grade inﬂation
equilibrium.” In the real world, however, one does observe equilibrium rejection from the pro-
fessor because the game is not repeated, or because the professor’s type changes.
26IV Empirical Tests
This section tests various propositions of the model using four distinct data sets. Two of the data
sets come from original surveys conducted by myself. The ﬁrst data set comes from a survey
for professors and instructors of the Department of Economics, UC Irvine. The second data set
comes from a survey for students in the Department of Economics, UC Irvine. The third data
set records the ranking of students who actually pestered the professors. The fourth data set
is the restricted academic records complied by the Ofﬁce of Institutional Research, UC Irvine.
Unfortunately, not all propositions are testable due to the lack of data.
IV.1 The Cost of Nuisance: Professors’ Viewpoints (Data Set 1)
How costly and annoying is students’ nuisance to professors? To answer this question, I con-
ducted a survey to assess the cost of nuisance to professors. All professors and instructors who
taught from spring 2006 to winter 2007 (including summer) in the Department of Economics,
UC Irvine, were solicited for this survey. 22 out of 48 professors/instructors responded, a 45.8%
response rate. The survey includes responses from four tenured faculty members, nine tenure-
track junior faculty members, and nine non-tenure-track instructors. Among these professors,
nine of them are female, and thirteen are male (see Table 4).
In this survey, the professors are asked to indicate whether they “strongly agree,” “agree,”
“have no opinion,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree” to the following two statements:
² “Responding to or acting on students’ complaints about grades or requests for more points is
COSTLY in terms of my time, effort, and/or energy.”
² “Students’ complaints about grades/requests for more points are ANNOYING.”
27Table 4: Professor Survey Data
Tenure Level Gender
Senior Professor 4 (18.2%) Male 13 (59.1%)
Junior Professor 9 (40.9%) Female 9 (40.9%)
Instructors 9 (40.9%)
Total 22 (100%) Total 22(100%)
Table 5: Professor Survey Results
Students’ Nuisance is Students’ Nuisance is
COSTLY ANNOYING
Strongly Agree 3 (13.6%) 2 (9.1%)
Agree 14 (63.6%) 14 (63.6%)
No Opinion 1 (4.5%) 0 (0%)
Disagree 3 (13.6%) 4 (18.2%)
Strongly Disagree 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
No Response 1 (4.5%) 1 (4.5%)
Agree or Strongly Agree 17 (77.3%) 16 (72.7%)
Disagree or Strongly Disagree 3 (13.6%) 4 (18.2%)
Total 22 (100%) 22 (100%)
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics: Professor Survey Data
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Annoying 21 3.714 0.902 2 5
Costly 21 3.810 0.873 2 5
Female 22 0.409 0.409 0 1
Tenure 22 0.182 0.395 0 1
28Table 7: Professor Survey: Correlation Coefﬁcients
Annoying Costly Female Tenure
Annoying 1.0000
Costly 0.5083 1.0000
Female 0.4523 0.5385 1.0000
Tenure 0.1231 -0.1721 -0.1531 1.0000
No professor responded “I strongly disagree” to either question. Table 5 shows that the
majority of professors and instructors agree or strongly agree that students’ nuisance is costly
and/or annoying. Table 6 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the data. Answer “I strongly
agree” is coded “5” in both questions; “I agree,” 4; “No opinion,” 3; “I disagree,” 2. “Tenure”
and “Female” are dummy variables.
Table7displaysthecorrelationcoefﬁcientsof“Annoying,” “Costly,” “Female,” and“Tenure.”
It shows a moderate positive correlation between Annoying and Female (0.4523), and between
“Costly” and “Female” (0.5385). This could be an indication that female professors/instructors
are more sensitive to students’ nuisance. Alternatively, female professors might be pestered
more often. There is a small positive association between “Annoying” and “Tenure.” Perhaps
tenured professors have been teaching for a longer period of time than untenured professors
have, thus, tenured professor experienced more students’ nuisance, which might cause the small
positive association between “Annoying” and “Tenure.” Not surprisingly, there is a moderate
negative association between “Tenure” and “Costly.” First, tenured professors are in general
more experienced with students’ nuisance; therefore, dealing with students’ nuisance is proba-
bly not that costly to them. Moreover, tenured professors are not under tremendous publication
stress as junior professors are. Tenured professors also have less teaching responsibilities than
29instructors do. Consequently, dealing with students’ nuisance is not that costly to tenured pro-
fessors.
IV.2 Value of the Grade and Cost of Studying
Utilizing a student survey, this section tests several hypotheses from the game theoretic model,
in particular, propositions III.6 and III.7.
Proposition III.6 suggests that a higher value of the grade (®i) does not necessarily make the
student more likely to pester the professor. On the one hand, as the value of the grade increases,
the optimal studying effort level prior to the exam increases, making pestering unnecessarily. On
the other hand, given any chosen studying effort level, a greater value of the grade makes the
student more likely to pester the professor after the exam. Therefore, the relationship between
the value of the grade and the likelihood of pestering is ambiguous.
Proposition III.7 suggests that a higher cost of studying reduces the optimal studying effort
level and increases the likelihood of pestering.
IV.2.1 Student Survey Data
To test proposition III.7, a survey was given to all students who took ECON 20A (Basic Eco-
nomics) and ECON 116 (Game Theory) in UC Irvine, Summer Session 1, 2007. 203 out of 239
students responded the survey, a rate of 85.0%. In this survey, students indicated whether they
“strongly agree,” “agree,” “have no opinion,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree” to the following
two statements:
² Grades (academic performance) are important to me.
² To me, studying takes a lot of time and effort.
30The students’ response to the ﬁrst statement indicated their value of the grade. For example, a
student who responded “I strongly agree” values his or her grade higher than a student who
responded “I agree,” and so on. The second statement measures the cost of studying of the
student. For example, a student who responded “I strongly agree” has a higher studying cost
than a student who responded “I agree,” and so on. No one responded “I strongly disagree” to
either statement. “I disagree” is coded as 0, “No opinion,” 1; “I agree,” 2; and “I strongly agree,”
3. Note that every student agrees or strongly agrees that grades are important. Students have
more varied answers regarding the cost of studying, although an average student agrees that
studying is “costly” in terms of his or her time and effort (see Table 8).
I also surveyed students’ history of pestering (variable Nuisance) by asking the following
question:
² In your college life, have you ever ask your professors/TAs to adjust up your grades in any assign-
ment, including homework, quiz, exam, extra credit assignment and other?
A “yes” answer is coded as 1, and “no,” 0. The appropriate interpretation of the responses to
this question might be debatable, because students might have asked the professor(s) to correct
grading mistakes. In an attempt to remove such ambiguity, I included an open-ended question
that students explain why they requested for more points. Not surprisingly, few students re-
quested more points due to grading mistakes, while a great majority requested for more points
without justiﬁcation. For example, students asked for upward adjustment of their grades when
their scores are close to the next higher rung. Alternatively, students “spent plenty of time, en-
ergy, and thoughts” on assignments, for which they “feel that they deserve better grades.” Some
students asked for better grades to avoid being dismissed from the university. Hence, “request-
ing for upward adjustment of the grade” is a reasonable, though not perfect, measurement of
31Table 8: Descriptive Statistics: Student Survey Data
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Nuisance 203 0.389 0.489 0 1
Value 202 0.653 0.477 2 3
Cost 203 2.138 0.856 0 3
GPA 164 3.002 0.438 1.909 3.91
Senior 202 0.579 0.495 0 1
Major 203 0.355 0.480 0 1
students’ nuisance (see Appendix E.2).
Finally, students report their college GPA and their year in school: freshman, sophomore,
junior, senior, or graduate. Students in their junior year and above are labeled as “Senior.” Note
that although 203 students responded the survey, only 164 students reported their GPAs (see
Table 8). Perhaps students feel less comfortable report their GPAs. Therefore, in the follow-
ing regression, the number of observation is 162, a much smaller number than the number of
students who responded the survey.
IV.2.2 Regression Model
Proposition III.6 suggests that the relationship between V alue and Nuisance is ambiguous,
while a higher cost of studying makes the student more likely to pester the professor. The linear
probability model can be expressed as the following:
Nuisance = ±0 + ±1V alue + ±2Cost + ±3Senior + ±4GPA + ±5Major + ²; (23)
where Nuisance indicates whether the student has pestered any professor before, V alue is the
value of the grade, Cost is the studying cost, Senior indicates students academic status in school
(freshmanandsophomore=0; junior, senior, andgraduate=1), andGPAisstudents’selfreported
32college GPA. Senior, GPA and Major are control variables. Naturally, juniors, seniors and
graduate students are more likely to have pestered a professor than freshmen and sophomores
are. GPA might affect the student’s incentive to pester the professor; for example, students
with lower GPAs might have more incentive to pester the professor, because a minimum GPA
is required to graduate in most departments of most universities. Finally, Major controls for the
diversiﬁed backgrounds of the students: Major = 1 if the student is an econ major; otherwise,
Major = 0. Students who have not selected their majors are considered “non-major.”
The major weakness of the linear probability model is that the estimated probability could
go above one or below zero. Notwithstanding this drawback, the coefﬁcients of the linear prob-
ability model are easy to interpret. As an alternative speciﬁcation, I also estimate a probit model
to check for robustness. Details are provided in Appendix D.
IV.2.3 Regression Results
OLS regression results are shown in Table 9. I ﬁrst discuss the variables of interest, and I analyze
control variables.
V alue AlthoughpropositionIII.6suggeststhattherelationshipisambiguousbetweenNuisance
and V alue, the regression results demonstrate a positive association between the two. The result
is statistically signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. On average, a unit increase in V alue raises
Nuisance by 0.1471. In words, a unit increase of the value of the grade raises the probability
that the student pesters the professor by 0.1471. One possible explanation for this result is that,
as described in proposition III.6, as the value of the grade increases, the nuisance threshold ei;0
rises faster than the optimal studying effort level e¤
i does (see Figure 2). Therefore, the increase
33Table 9: Regression Results: Student Survey Data














Absolute t values are in parentheses.
¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ¤ signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
of V alue causes students’ optimal studying effort level to fall into the “pestering region.” As a
result, there is a positive association between Nuisance and V alue.
Cost There is a positive association between Cost and Nuisance, as predicted by proposition
III.7. On average, one unit increase of studying cost raises Nuisance by 0.068. That is, the
probability the student pesters the professor is 0.068 higher with a unit increase of studying cost.
The result is almost signiﬁcant at the ten percent level (P-Value=0.141).
Senior Naturally, the longer a student stays in the university, the more likely he has pestered
a professor at some point. Not surprisingly, Senior is positively associated with Nuisance. One
unit increase of Senior is associated with 0.1958 unit increase of Nuisance. In other words, the
probability that juniors, seniors, and graduate students pester their professors is 0.1958 higher
than freshmen and sophomores do, other things being equal. The coefﬁcient is statistically sig-
34niﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level.
GPA and Major Neither GPA nor Major is statistically associated with Nuisance. The
sign of GPA’s coefﬁcient is negative; perhaps good students have less incentive to pester their
professors.6 Major is positive but statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that econ majors are not
more likely to pester professors than non-majors are.
IV.3 The Rankings of Pestering Students (Data Set 3)
Anecdotal evidence suggests that most pestering students have low rankings in classes. To tell
the rankings of pestering students, I collect data from six UC Irvine econ professors/instructors
about the rankings of pestering students in the classes they taught in spring 2006 and summer
2007. Each professor taught exactly one class during this period. The professors recorded the
ﬁnal ranking (in percentiles) of each pestering student. For instance, if there are 200 students in
a class, and the pestering student is ranked 198 in that class, his or her ranking is 99%. Students
are considered “pestering” the professor if they asked for upward adjustment of their grades
without justiﬁcation. Tables 10 and 11 show the distribution of these pestering students.
Table 11 shows that there are more pestering students that come from the bottom than from
the top of the distribution. For instance, there are 15 pestering students that come from bottom
10% (ranking> 90%), but only 6 pestering students that come from top 10% (ranking< 10%).
There are 25 pestering students that come from bottom 20% (ranking> 80%), but only 16 pester-
ing students that come from top 20% (ranking< 20%). Table 11 demonstrate that more pestering
students come from the bottom rather than the top of the class.
6There could be endogeneity between Nuisance and GPA. However, the regression results without GPA is similar
to the regression results reported here.














Table 11: Pestering Students Ranking Data
Ranking Count Percentage Ranking Count Percentage
Percentile Percentile
< 10 6 5.22% > 90 15 13.04%
< 20 16 13.91% > 80 25 21.74%
< 30 27 23.48% > 70 41 35.65%
< 40 40 34.78% > 60 50 43.48%
< 50 51 44.35% > 50 64 55.65%
36IV.4 Class Size (Data Set 4)
Proposition III.9 suggests that, if the professor is “lenient,” and the proportion of pestering stu-
dents is ﬁxed, other things being equal, the larger the class size, the more likely one observes
preemptive grade inﬂation. This section utilizes data collected from UC Irvine Registrar and
Ofﬁce of Institutional Research (OIR) to test the effect of class size on grade inﬂation.
The data include nearly all students who entered UC Irvine as freshmen and have taken
intermediate micro and macroeconomics (ECON 100A, B, C) from fall 2001 to spring 2006 (sum-
mer 2005 excluded) and their grades in those classes. 100A is the prerequisite of 100B and 100C,
and 100B is the prerequisite of 100C. The data also include class enrollments and each student’s
UCI grade point average (GPA), high school GPA, SAT math and verbal scores, and major (ex-
clusively economics or not).
There are several drawbacks of the data. First, data on students’ types (potential pestering
students or not) are unavailable. Utilizing the results from section IV.3, I approximate pestering
students by poor performers. Additionally, there are only a few observations in this data set,
because not many non-majors take these upper level economics classes: there are merely 1605
observations in 100A, 1470 in 100B, and 1225 in 100C.7
The major shortcoming of this data is that, in compliance with Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA)8, OIR cannot provide the detailed data I requested. OIR worries that
complete records of students’ course grades, SAT scores, UCI GPAs, and high school GPAs
could make students identiﬁable and thus violate FERPA. Hence, OIR could only release the
7The reason for the descending number is that OIR include 100B students only if they already took 100A, and 100C
students only if they already took 100A and 100B.
8As recorded from ed.gov, “The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) is a Federal law that protects
the privacy of student education records. The law applies to all schools that receive funds under an applicable program
of the U.S. Department of Education.” For details, see http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/index.html.
37de-identiﬁed and additionally restricted data. Rather than reporting raw grades, OIR labels A+,
A and A- as A; B+, B, and B- as B; C+, C and C- as C; D+, D and D- as D; F and incomplete
grades as “O.” I transformed the letter grades into numbered grades: “A” as “4”, “B,” “3;” “C,”
“2;” “D,” 1; “O,” 0. If a student takes a class multiple times, only the ﬁrst grade is included in the
sample. This is to maintain the consistency of students’ grades and ability, as it is presumably
easier to perform well in a class when taken the second time.
Data on students’ UCI GPAs are also restricted: OIR aggregated GPAs into several bands,
and I took the mid point of the band as the student’s GPA. For example, if the student’s GPA is
2.47, OIR labels it as “2.41-2.50,” and I took the midpoint 2.45 as the student’s GPA. GPAs below
1.9 are labeled as 1.85.
OIR is also unable to provide data of each student’s SAT scores and high school GPA sepa-
rately. Rather, the SAT scores and high school GPA are combined to make an admission “Index.”
TheformulaforIndexis400timeshighschoolGPA,plusthesumofSATmathandverbalscores.
OIR further restricts this number into several bands, and the midpoints of each band is taken as
the Index of the student. Finally, OIR provides a major dummy variable that indicates whether
students are econ majors or not. Unfortunately, OIR wrongly labeled double major in econ as
“non-major,” so this variable could be uninformative. The data might be somewhat noisy be-
cause of the restriction of FERPA.
Instructors’ Information I gather instructors’ information from UC Irvine Searchable Sched-
ule of Classes (WebSOC), a web tool offered by the UC Irvine registrar. WebSOC preserves class
information such as instructors’ names and enrollments of all UC Irvine classes offered in the
most recent ﬁve years. I matched instructors’ names offered by WebSOC and the class size in-




Grade 2.86 2.56 2.56
(0.84) (0.92) (1.02)
Size 267.38 259.09 270.17
(96.32) (87.56) (74.23)
GPA 3.06 3.07 3.08
(0.41) (0.41) (0.40)
Index 2643.84 2644.49 2639.53
(201.53) (201.01) (204.84)
Number of Classes 11 1 11
Number of Senior Professors 2 1 0
Number of Junior Professors 3 2 4
Number of Instructors 1 1 3
formation provided by OIR to determine the instructor of each class.
Season is the main cause of the variation in class sizes (see Table 12). 100A is offered in fall
and winter; 100B, winter and spring; 100C, spring and fall. Students usually take 100A in fall,
100B in winter, and 100C in spring. Those who fail to take 100A in fall take it in the following
winter, and 100B, C in spring and fall, respectively. Hence, 100A has larger class sizes in fall than
in winter; 100B has larger class sizes in winter than in spring, and 100C has larger class sizes in
spring than in fall.
A small number of students added or dropped classes in the end of the quarter. As a result,
there could be a small gap between the records of WebSOC and those provided by OIR. For
instance, for a speciﬁc class, the enrollment records of WebSOC on several quarters were 367,
197, 272, 100, and 246, respectively. Except for one class that has the perfect match in enrollment,
every class has a small gap (one to ﬁve students) between the records from WebSOC and OIR.
Fortunately, different classes have large variations in sizes, so I was able to match most classes
39and the instructors.
IV.4.1 The Ordinary Least Squares Model
The model seeks to explain grade inﬂation by students’ nuisance, which can be affected by class
size. The grade for ECON 100 series is the dependent variable.
Grade = ¯0 + ¯1Size + ¯2Size ¤ GPA + ¯3Assist + ¯4Full
+ ¯5GPA + ¯6Log Index + ¯7Major + ¯8Class + ¯9Prereq + ²; (24)
where Grade is the course grade, Size is the class enrollment, Size ¤ GPA is the interaction of
GPA and Size. According to proposition III.9, ¯1 is expected to be positive, because a professor
is more likely to preemptively inﬂate grades when the class size is large. ¯2 is expected to be
positive, because good students enjoy positive externality from poor performers’ threat of nui-
sance; hence, good students receive better grades in larger classes than they would receive in
small classes, other things being equal.
Assist and Full are dummy variables of assistant professors and full professors, respectively.
Adjunct professors are the baseline teachers; there are no associate professors in the data set. No
full professors or associate professors taught 100C in the sample period. UC Irvine is a research
university, where research publications are important in tenure decisions. Because assistant pro-
fessors have more incentive to inﬂate grades to avoid students’ nuisance and to focus on their
own research, ¯3 is expected to be positive. According to “buy good teaching evaluation” the-
ory, adjuncts need good teaching evaluations to renew contracts with the school; hence, ¯4 is
expected to be negative.
GPA is the student’s cumulative UCI GPA before he took any 100 class; Log Index is the log
40of Index; Major is the major code, with 1 representing exclusively major in econ and 0 other-
wise. These variables control for students’ discipline, aptitudes, and human capital. ¯5 and ¯6
are expected to be positive, but the sign of ¯7 is unknown. Although econ majors often outper-
form non-majors in learning economics, exclusive econ majors are not necessarily better than
those who double major in econ. Class is the class dummy variable that controls for different
ECON 100 classes in the pooled data.
Finally, Prereq is the grade earned on prerequisite econ 100 series classes. For example,
grades earned for 100A and 100B are included as control variables for 100C regression. Grade
earned for 100A is a control variable for 100B regression. Because the three classes are designed
to be taken in sequence, grades earned for prerequisites could be good indications for the per-
formance of subsequent 100 series classes. ² is the residual.
IV.4.2 Regression Results
Table (13) shows the results of the linear regression for 100A, 100B, 100C, and the pooled data.
Class Size Proposition III.9 suggests that the larger the class size, the more likely one observes
preemptive grade inﬂation. Contrary to the prediction, class size is negatively associated with
grades for all regressions, with 100A an exception after controlling for Size ¤ GPA. The mag-
nitude of the coefﬁcient is small, however: for instance, for the pooled data, an increase of 100
students in the class lowers the student’s grade by a ﬁfth letter grade (coefﬁcient = ¡0:002).
There could be several reasons for the negative association. First, proposition III.9 assumes that
the proportion of pestering students does not change among different classes. This assump-
tion might not hold, as the proportion of pestering students might change in the sample period.
41Second, one complicating factor not considered in the theoretic framework is that professor’s
sympathy cost might change with different class sizes. As the class size grows, the professor be-
comes relatively distant from each student in the class. Consequently, the sympathy cost might
change: it might be relatively easier for the professor to fail some anonymous students in a large
class at the cost of possible students’ nuisance. The game theoretic model does not reﬂect this
change in sympathy cost. Third, the model does not incorporate a possible learning effect in
class size. It could be easier for the professor to control a small class than a large class, thereby
improving students’ performance. The “distance effect” and “learning effect” work in the oppo-
site direction of nuisance effect, causing class size to have a negative sign. In fact, nuisance effect
might explain why researchers have difﬁculties ﬁnding “size effect” empirically (Lazear 2001).
Finally, if professors are “strict,” they will not inﬂate grades; consequently, grade inﬂation does
not occur, and the class size does not affect grade inﬂation.
Interaction Size ¤ GPA captures the positive externality that good students enjoy from the
nuisance effect. Size ¤ GPA is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level for 100B, but statistically
insigniﬁcant for 100A, 100C, and the pooled data. In particular, Size ¤ GPA has a wrong sign
for 100A, although it is statistically insigniﬁcant. 100A has the most full professor teaching the
class. Full professors are less likely to preemptively inﬂate grades because they do not have
tenure pressure; perhaps this is why there is no “positive externality” in 100A.
Tenure Status Assistant professors give higher grades than adjunct professors and full pro-
fessors, with 100B being an exception. However, there is only one full professor in 100B in the
sampled period, so one cannot tell whether that full professor gives higher grades because of
42his or her tenure status or personality. In 100A, 100C, and the pooled data, students who were
taught by assistant professors did better than those taught by full professors or adjunct profes-
sors, other things being equal. In 100A, a student scored about one third letter grade higher
(0.33) if he or she took the class from an assistant professor rather than from a full professor. In
100C, a student scored about one-fourth letter grade higher (0.24) if he or she took the class from
an assistant professor rather than from an adjunct professor. In general (in the pooled data), a
student scored higher (0.18) if he or she took the class from an assistant professor rather than
from a full professor or an adjunct professor, other things being equal.
There are several possible explanations for these results. First, assistant professors might
be better teachers than full professors and adjunct professors are. This is not very convincing,
though, because there are nine different assistant professors in the data set, and it is unlikely that
they are all better teachers. Another explanation, as suggested by several researchers such as
Moore and Trahan (1998) and Sonner (2000), is that assistant professors attempt to “buy tenure.”
This explanation, however, is hardly plausible, because research (rather than teaching) deter-
mines tenure decision in the Department of Economics, UC Irvine. As long as the faculty mem-
ber’s teaching evaluation meets some minimum standards, teaching evaluation is of marginal
importance in tenure and promotion decisions.
Anotherexplanationisthatassistantprofessorgradelenientlytopreemptstudents’nuisance.
In a research university such as UC Irvine, assistant professors undergo tremendous stress from
demanding research publication requirements, and the opportunity cost of not doing research
is prohibitively high. Instead of dealing with pestering students’ requests for added points,
assistant professors inﬂate grades to prevent students’ nuisance.
ContrarytotheﬁndingsofMooreandTrahan(1998)andSonner(2000), Idonotﬁndevidence
43that adjunct professors give higher grades than tenure track faculties do. Grades are negatively
associated with adjunct faculties at the one percent level, with 100A as an exception, though
there is only one adjunct faculty member teaching 100A and 100B in the sampled period. This
ﬁnding casts some doubt on the “buying good teaching evaluation” theory.
Control Variables GPA is a strong predictor of grades. One letter grade advantage in GPA is
associated with a higher letter grade in all 100 series classes; the coefﬁcients of GPA for regres-
sions are statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. A high GPA suggests good learning
ability and discipline; therefore, students with higher GPAs perform better in 100 series classes.
For 100A, 100C and the pooled data, there exists a positive and statistically signiﬁcant as-
sociation between grades and Log Index, although the marginal effect of Index on grades is
minimal. No positive association is found between grades earned in 100B and Log Index. The
results are similar to the ﬁndings of Butler et al. (1998), who ﬁnd no signiﬁcant association
between SAT verbal score and the grades of intermediate micro- or macroeconomics, and no
association between SAT math score and grade in intermediate macroeconomics.
In none of 100A, B, C is there any signiﬁcant association between Major and grades, al-
though Major is negatively associated with grades in the pooled data at the 5% level. While
econ majors are expected to perform better than non-econ students do, students who major ex-
clusively in econ do not necessarily outperform those who double major in econ. Moreover, a
non-major (for example, an engineering major) is not necessarily worse in math than an econ
major is, and math skill is crucial for good performance in ECON 100 series. All these factors

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































45The grade earned in 100A and 100B are positively and signiﬁcantly associated with grades
earned in the following 100 series classes at the 1% and 5% level. One letter grade advantage
of 100A is associated with an improvement of one-sixth (0.17) of a letter grade in 100B and one-
fourteenth (0.07) of a letter grade in 100C. One letter grade advantage of 100B is associated with
an improvement of one ﬁfth (0.2) of a letter grade in 100C. This is not surprising, because of
the course design that the three classes are to be taken in sequence. The knowledge obtained in
100A is crucial in learning 100B, and so on. Moreover, there could be a screening effect. Poor
performers in 100A or 100B might not complete the sequence; that is why enrollment dropped
on average over the sequence.
V Conclusions and Comments
In this paper, I presented a game theoretic model to show how the threat of students’ nuisance
can induce professors to inﬂate grades. The model suggests that students are more likely to
pester the professor if the professor is “lenient,” the unit cost of studying is high, the reward
of pestering is high, the cost of pestering is low, and when information is asymmetric students
assign high priors that the professor is “lenient.” Moreover, students with a high value of the
grade might or might not be more likely to pester the professor. A student who values his grade
more highly is more likely to pester the professor after the exam; however, the student will exert
more effort in studying before the exam, making pestering unnecessary. A student with a high
cost of studying is more likely to pester the professor. Finally, if the professor is “lenient” and
the proportion of pestering students is ﬁxed, other things being equal, the larger the class size,
and the more likely one observes preemptive grade inﬂation in larger classes.
46The empirical tests weakly support parts of the game theoretic model. About three quar-
ters of the surveyed professors/instructors agree or strongly agree that “students’ nuisance is
annoying” and “costly in terms of time, effort and energy.” Students’ value of the grade is posi-
tively associated with nuisance; the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the ten percent level.
Students’ cost of studying is positively associated with nuisance, although the effect is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant (P ¡ V alue = 0:14). A majority of pestering students are composed of poor
performers. The empirical tests show no evidence of preemptive grade inﬂation.
Researchers have discussed possible causes of grade inﬂation. Yet, they neglect students’
nuisance as an alternative explanation for grade inﬂation, probably because they themselves,
as professors, are so used to students’ complaints and nuisance. The main contribution of this
paper is that it brings our attention to the costly nuisance that not only aggravates grade inﬂation
but also hinders professors from research, teaching preparation, and department service.
For simplicity, the game assumes that students are unable to collude with one another. In
real life, however, one does observe students colluding with one another to exchange infor-
mation about the grading of speciﬁc professors. Information exchange websites such as rate-
myprofessors.com greatly facilitate communication among students. Sharing information helps
to eliminate asymmetric information. For example, one would observe fewer rejections from
the professor if more students are aware that the professor is “strict.” Although this paper does
not discuss delaying grade inﬂation under asymmetric information, the reader should be able
to picture such a case. Suppose the professor delays grade inﬂation. Student i has a low ¼i,
so he accepts the grade. However, once his classmates tell him that the professor delays grade
inﬂation, he will pester the professor if inequality (4) holds. If many students behave the same
way as student i does, the professor might switch her strategy from delaying grade inﬂation to
47preemptive grade inﬂation.
This paper assumes numerical grades. In the real life, however, grades can be given in alpha-
beticallettersornumericnumbers. Ifgradesaregiveninalphabeticalletters, theutilityfunctions
of students will be step functions. In that case, students whose grades are close to the next higher
rung (a high payoff of pestering) are more likely to pester the professor than are those students
whose grades are further away from the next higher rung, other things being equal.
While this paper focuses on students’ nuisance, this study has a broad perspective. Future
research will extend the model to describe and analyze the behavior of persistent telemarketers,
salespeople, and solicitors who try hard to win potential subscribers, customers, and donors.
A Threshold Studying Effort Level e0
A.1 Proof of Equations (3) and (4)
Deﬁne E(ei) as the following:












E is monotonically decreasing in ei. Since E(ei;0) is equal to zero, it follows that equations (3)
and (4) hold.
A.2 Proof of Equation (14)
Deﬁne ¡ as the following:
¡ = (ei;0 + ´)®i ¡ e
®i
i;0 ¡ · = 0:













































Equation (27) holds if ei;0 ¸ 1.
A.3 Proof of Equations (15) and (16)
This section shows that optimal studying effort levels for potential pestering students (e¤
D;CP)
and that of the students who accept the grades (e¤
D;A) are increasing in the value of the grade,
®, and decreasing in the cost of studying, ¸. Additionally, e¤













































































= ¡1 < 0: (30)
B The Proportion of Pestering Students, q
B.1 The Threshold Proportion of Pestering Students, q¤
This section shows that for all n, there exists only one q¤ such that
M(n) = M(q¤n) + N(q¤n):
49PROOF: Suppose there exist two numbers, ¹ q 6= q, such that the above equation holds. Without
lost of generality, assume that ¹ q > q. It follows that
M(n) = M(¹ qn) + N(¹ qn)
M(n) = M(qn) + N(qn);
which implies
N(¹ qn) ¡ N(qn) = M(qn) ¡ M(¹ qn):
Recall that N(¢) and M(¢) are monotonically increasing, and that ¹ q > q. Therefore, the left hand
side of the equation above is positive, but the right hand side of the equation is negative. Thus,
there is a contradiction. 2
B.2 Proof of Equation (17)
This section shows that given a concave moral cost function M(¢) and a convex nuisance cost
functionN(¢), the larger the number of studentsn, the smaller the threshold proportion of poten-
tial pestering students (q¤) that the professor is indifferent between preemptive grade inﬂation
(PI) and delaying grade inﬂation (D).
M(n) = M(q¤n) + N(q¤n):
Differentiating both sides of the equation with respect to q¤, one can ﬁnd
0 = nM0(q¤n) + nN0(q¤n):
Dividing both sides of the equation by n, one can ﬁnd
0 = M0(q¤n) + N0(q¤n):
50Let G be the sum of the above equation,
G = M0(q¤n) + N0(q¤n) = 0:












Therefore, the greater n, the smaller q¤. 2
C Student i’s Prior, ¼i




















H(ei) is monotonically decreasing in ei, and H(ei;¼;0) is equal to zero. It follows that inequalities
(19) and (20) hold.
C.2 Proof of Equations (21) and (22)
Ui(eij¼i;si = CP) = ¼i(ei + ´) + (1 ¡ ¼i)e
®i
i ¡ ¸iei ¡ ·:
51Table 14: Probit Regression Results: Student Survey Data














Log Likelihood=-102.25325. Number of observations: 162. Standard deviation are in parentheses.
¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ¤ signiﬁcant at the 10% level.




= ¼i®i(ei + ´)®i¡1 + ®i(1 ¡ ¼i)e®i¡1 ¡ ¸i = 0:
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D The Probit Model
Table 14 shows the probit regression results. The results of the probit model are similar to those
in the linear probability model (LPM). The signs of the coefﬁcients are the same as those in the
LPM. V alue is positive and signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. Senior is positive and signiﬁcant
at the ﬁve percent level. The probit model suggests that the higher the value of the grade, the
more likely the student is to pester the professor. Furthermore, juniors, seniors, and graduate
52students are more likely to have pestered their professors than freshmen and sophomores, as
predicted in the LPM.
E Students’ Nuisance
E.1 Professors’ and TAs’ Stories
I collected the following anecdotes from professors and TAs in the Department of Economics,
UC Irvine. They describe cases where students pester them for added points.
² A student received a B+ and her grade was close to an A-. She emailed the professor and
askedthe professortoraise hergrade up, saying: “Iam surethatin my homework, quizzes,
or exams, I will be able to ﬁnd a small grading mistake that can pump my grade up to an
A-. To save your time, why don’t you just give me an A-.”
² A student went to a TA to ask for more points for a quiz. The TA rejected the request,
because he did not think that the student had a case. Yet, the persistent student started to
cry, so the TA gave up: “OK, I will just give you the points to get rid of you.”
² A student asked for more points on the ﬁnal exam in order to get an A. The TA did not
grant the points because the student’s answer was wrong. The student replied: “But I have
to have an A; I have never received anything worse than that.” The TA was so annoyed, so
he gave the points.
² A student received a D and asked the professor to give him a C-, because that was the last
class he took, and he already received a job offer. The professor felt sorry for this student
and passed him.
53² A student wrote a 470-word email to a professor explaining why she could not accept the
grade she received, and that she needed an appointment with the professor to check if she
received proper credit for every single assignment and the ﬁnal exam. The student also
asked the professor to reply “ASAP.”
E.2 Students’ Students’ Viewpoints
The survey asks students to describe the cases where they requested upward adjustments of
their grades from professors/TAs. Here are several responses.
² The student feels that he/she deserves more points.
² The student was “just one point away” from an A-, so he/she asked for a grade raise.
² The student received a low grade for a research paper assignment in which the overall
grade depended only on the one midterm exam, the research paper, and the ﬁnal exam.
The student thinks he/she spent plenty of time, energy, and thought on the assignment
and has never received a grade that low for a paper. After emailing the TA to reconsider
his/her case, the TA replied in a mass email to the students that she would not be changing
any grades for any reason, and that she would not be available to set up any meetings to
even discuss the subject in person.
² Some students asked for more points because of grading mistakes.
² A student asked for an adjustment on a ﬁnal exam so that he/she would not “get kicked
out of college.”
² A student said “I just basically emailed the professor to bump me up a letter grade. I tried
to be nice when I complain[ed].”
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